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In Why Our Next President May Keep His or Her Senate Seat: A 
Conjecture on the Constitution's Incompatibility Clause, Seth Barrett 
Tillman argues that a sitting President may serve simultaneously as a 
member of Congress.1 The Incompatibility Clause speaks to this very 
matter. It specifies that "no Person holding any Office under the 
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his 
Continuance in Office."2 Mr. Tillman asserts that the President is 
neither an officer nor holds an office "under the United States."3 
Though he cites many different law review articles and constitutional 
provisions,4 Mr. Tillman has done little to dislodge conventional 
wisdom. The President occupies an "Office under the United States." 
Hence, no sitting member of Congress may concurrently serve as 
President. 
I. DOES THE PRESIDENT OCCUPY AN "OFFICE"? 
The Constitution leaves no room for cavil. Article II, Section 1 
provides that the President "shall hold his Office during the Term of 
four Years."5 It also limits who may hold that office: 
No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United 
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be 
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SIDEBAR 1, 2–3 (2008). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
 3. Tillman, supra note 1, at 32. 
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eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be 
eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of 
thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the 
United States.6 
The now-superseded provisions dealing with presidential 
succession repeatedly refer to the President's office.7 Furthermore, the 
Presidential Oath Clause dictates that before he enters on the 
"Execution of his Office," the President must take an oath promising 
to "faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States."8 
Finally, the text of numerous amendments—the Twelfth, Twenty-
Second, and Twenty-Fifth—confirms that the President occupies an 
office.9 
Curiously, Mr. Tillman never discusses these provisions fatal to his 
first claim. He argues instead that the President is not an officer, but 
"a holder of an Article VI public trust—a public fiduciary."10 Hence, 
Mr. Tillman apparently believes that the office of the President is not 
filled by an officer but by a holder—a holder of a public trust. From 
the corporate law field, Mr. Tillman tries to conjure up evidence of 
such officer-less offices. He argues that corporate directors occupy 
offices and yet are not regarded as corporate officers.11 Unfortunately, 
none of his examples indicate that, though directors hold offices, they 
are not officers. At most, Mr. Tillman demonstrates that in the 
corporate context, "officers" typically refers to Treasurers, Chief 
Executives, etc.12 This hardly establishes that directors are not officers, 
but instead merely suggests that individuals often use "officers" in a 
more limited sense to encompass only some corporate officers. If 
directors occupy offices, as Mr. Tillman claims, they are also officers, 
albeit not the ones who immediately come to mind. 
Regardless, whether our world currently abounds with officer-less 
offices, Mr. Tillman cites no founding-era usage suggesting that this 
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 7. Id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 6, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV (referring to “the 
Removal of the President from Office” and “the Powers and Duties of the said Office”) 
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 11. Id. at 10–11 & n.24. 
 12. Id. 
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was the case then. Such evidence is probably unavailable. Consider in 
this respect an eighteenth-century dictionary that defines "officer" as 
"one who is in an Office."13 Given this definition and general 
eighteenth-century usage, an office was officer-less only when no 
person occupied the office. 
At any rate, Mr. Tillman's attempt to conjure up evidence for the 
concept of an officer-less office is rather beside the point, for the 
Incompatibility Clause uses the term "Office" not "Officer." So even 
if officer-less offices were possible, even common, when the 
Constitution was ratified, it does not advance Mr. Tillman's ball. Mr. 
Tillman focuses on extraneous matters, and pays too little attention to 
the text of the Incompatibility Clause. 
In the face of the textual evidence arrayed against his thesis, Mr. 
Tillman supplies no sound historical reasons to support his argument 
that the President does not occupy an office. The first bit of evidence 
he presents fails to stand up to much scrutiny. Mr. Tillman recounts 
that President George Washington received a key to the Bastille as a 
gift from Marquis de Lafayette, an officer of the French government.14 
Had Washington occupied an office under the United States, his 
unauthorized receipt of this gift would have been unconstitutional, or 
so Mr. Tillman argues.15 After all, the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
provides that, in the absence of congressional consent, persons 
holding offices under "these United States" may not accept gifts from 
"any King, Prince, or foreign State."16 Despite his evident devotion to 
the Constitution, Washington never sought congressional consent to 
keep the key.17 According to Mr. Tillman, Washington's unilateral 
acceptance of this gift reveals that Washington did not believe that the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause applied to the President and that 
Washington could have reached that conclusion only if he believed 
that he did not occupy an office under the United States.18 
Mr. Tillman has overplayed his hand. Lafayette was neither a King 
nor a Prince. So the only question is whether the gift came from a 
foreign state via Lafayette. Given that Washington considered 
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 14. Tillman, supra note 1, at 25–26. 
 15. Id. at 24–27. 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
 17. See Tillman, supra note 1, at 25 & n.58 (noting Washington’s failure to notify Congress 
and the lack of documentation indicating that he ever did). 
 18. Id. at 25–27, nn. 58, 61. 
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Lafayette his adopted son, Washington likely did not regard the key 
as anything more than a personal gift from an extremely close friend. 
Indeed, Mr. Tillman provides absolutely no evidence that either 
Washington or Lafayette viewed the key as a gift from Lafayette as a 
representative of the French government rather than from Lafayette 
in his personal capacity. To the contrary, Mr. Tillman quotes 
Washington's letter to Lafayette, which speaks of the key as a 
"testimonial[] of [Lafayette's] friendship."19 Had Mr. Tillman dug 
deeper, he would have discovered that Lafayette's letter speaks of the 
key as a "tribute which I owe as a son to my adopted father, as an aid-
de-camp to my general, as a missionary of liberty to its patriarch."20 
Moreover, though Thomas Paine's letter to Washington about the 
Bastille Key mentions the French government at length, Paine claims 
that the key is a personal present from Lafayette.21 Given this context, 
why on earth would Washington suppose that a gift from his adopted 
son was a gift from the French government? In the absence of real 
evidence that Washington inexplicably thought that Lafayette gave 
the gift on behalf of a foreign government,22 this episode does nothing 
to advance Mr. Tillman's argument. 
Mr. Tillman makes an additional historical claim meant to defeat 
the argument that the President is an officer under the United States. 
He asserts that although the Constitution provides that the President 
"shall Commission all the Officers of the United States," Washington 
never commissioned himself or John Adams.23 This supposedly 
indicates that neither Washington nor Adams were officers. Mr. 
 
 19. See id. at 25 & n.58 (citing Letter from George Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette 
(Aug. 11, 1790), in 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 86 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 
1939)). 
 20. Letter from George Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette (Aug. 11, 1790), in 31 
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 85 n.56 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) [hereinafter 
WRITINGS] (quoting the Marquis de Lafayette’s March 17 letter to Washington) (emphasis 
added). 
 21. Letter from Thomas Paine to George Washington (May 1, 1790), in 10 THE WRITINGS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 104–06 (Jared Sparks ed., 1847). 
 22. Mr. Tillman ominously asks how Lafayette came to possess the Bastille Key, 
speculating that he may have received it from the French government. He also notes that 
sovereigns act only through their officers, implying that Lafayette’s act was an act of the French 
government. Tillman, supra note 1, at 25 n.58. But this is rather silly. The question is not 
whether Lafayette obtained the key from someone in the French government. The question is 
whether Washington had any reason to believe the key was a gift from the French government. 
Mr. Tillman supplies no reason for any such notion. Moreover, that governments always act 
through their officers hardly means that every act an officer takes is an act of the government. 
Officers of government have personal lives too. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
 23. Tillman, supra note 1, at 16–17 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
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Tillman further declares that Presidents have never commissioned 
either themselves or their corresponding Vice-Presidents.24 
Unfortunately, he offers no evidence to support any of these 
propositions, but merely asserts them as fact. He neither cites any of 
Washington's contemporaries nor cites any historians who claim that 
Washington never commissioned himself. That no physical evidence 
of such a commission exists, however, certainly does not prove that 
the President never issued one. Indeed, if there were no evidence of a 
commission granted to the first Secretary of State, that would hardly 
establish that Washington never commissioned Thomas Jefferson.25 
The same must be said about whether Washington commissioned 
himself and John Adams. 
When founding-era evidence is considered, an avalanche buries 
the fanciful claims that the President neither occupies an office nor is 
an officer. The Federalist Papers repeatedly refer to the President 
both as an occupier of an office and as an officer.26 George 
Washington himself used the phrase the "President and other public 
officers"27 thereby indicating that the President was an officer. He also 
observed that he served in the "[o]ffice of President."28 Other 
founding-era contemporaries, such as Alexander Hamilton29 and 
members of Congress, spoke of the President as occupying an office.30 
Possibly recognizing that his argument that the President does not 
occupy an office has a legion of difficulties, Mr. Tillman shifts tack in a 
footnote. He suggests that perhaps the President does not occupy an 
office for Incompatibility Clause purposes but rather for the purposes 
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 25. For a previous project, I examined Washington-era commissions in the National 
Archives. The Archives contain very few commissions even though it is likely that hundreds 
were issued during the Washington era. That there is no record of other commissions does not 
lead to the conclusion that Washington issued no other commission. 
 26. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), NOS. 66, 68, 69, 72 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
 27. Letter from George Washington to Alexander White (Mar. 25, 1798), in 36 WRITINGS, 
supra note 20, at 190. 
 28. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Solomon Bush (Nov. 24, 1789), in 30 
WRITINGS, supra note 20, at 465–66; Letter from George Washington to Eleonor Francois Elie, 
Comte de Moustier (May 25, 1789), in 30 WRITINGS, supra note 20, at 333–35. 
 29. See Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Oct. 3, 1788), in 30 
WRITINGS, supra note 20, at 110 n.31 (referring to Washington’s “acceptance of the office of 
President”) (quoting letter from Hamilton, source unknown). 
 30. See Letter from George Washington to David Stuart (July 26, 1789), in 30 WRITINGS, 
supra note 20, at 363 n.61 (mentioning Senate Committee appointed to determine the “style or 
tides” attached to “offices of President and Vice President of the United States”) (quoting 
citation unclear). 
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of other provisions, such as the Necessary and Proper Clause.31 Under 
this reading of the Constitution, the President occupies an office for 
the purposes of Article II, is an officer for the purposes of Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 18, yet neither occupies an office nor is an officer for 
the purposes of the Foreign Emoluments, Incompatibility, and 
Commissions Clauses. But Mr. Tillman supplies no reason why the 
meaning of "office" would differ depending upon the provision in 
question or why "office" sometimes includes the President and at 
other times excludes him. Absent a plausible explanation supported 
by historical evidence, there is no reason for supposing that the 
Constitution uses a common term—"office"—in multiple ways. 
II. "UNDER THE UNITED STATES" 
Like a good lawyer, Mr. Tillman argues in the alternative. Besides 
asserting that the President holds a public trust rather than an office, 
he also claims that the President does not occupy an office "under the 
United States" because the President is not a "creature" under the 
United States.32 
To occupy an office under the United States is to occupy an office 
created under the authority of the United States. Because the 
President occupies an office created under the authority of the United 
States, he occupies an "Office under the United States." The 
Constitution uses the phrase "Office under the United States" or its 
equivalents multiple times to distinguish federal officers from officers 
under the authority of a state,33 not to distinguish, in a highly obscure 
manner, the President from other officers. All federal officers, 
executive and judicial, occupy "offices under the United States" and 
are "officers of the United States." 
Mr. Tillman obviously believes otherwise. But the precise basis of 
his disagreement is rather puzzling. First, he never quite specifies the 
meaning of "Office under the United States." Yet this is absolutely 
crucial, for if he cannot define this phrase, he cannot claim that the 
President does not fit within its boundaries. Second, although he does 
 
 31. See Tillman, supra note 1, at 12–13 n.28. 
 32. Tillman, supra note 1, at 26–27; see also id. at 27–32. 
 33. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 200–01 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND] (reporting on Luther Martin’s Genuine Information); see also 
4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 49–50 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d. ed. 1936) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES] 
(reporting the comments of Archibald Maclaine at the North Carolina ratifying convention). 
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not directly say so, Mr. Tillman must believe that a second category of 
federal offices exists that neither arises from nor answers to the 
United States. Yet, once again, Mr. Tillman does not flesh out this 
second category. For instance, he never discusses which, if any, other 
federal offices are likewise not "under the United States." Finally, Mr. 
Tillman never explains why the Constitution embodies this hidden 
and abstruse distinction between one explicit category of offices 
under the United States and a second category of offices that exists 
neither under the United States nor under any individual state. 
Even if Mr. Tillman could explain his second category of offices 
and the reason why it serves some useful purpose, his distinction 
generates fairly odd conclusions about the scope of some rather 
familiar clauses. First, executive and judicial officers could be 
impeached and removed from their respective offices but could not 
be barred from serving as President or Vice President. Article I 
prohibits impeached officers from ever serving in offices "under the 
United States."34 But if the President and Vice President do not 
occupy offices "under the United States," then the Senate through the 
impeachment process could not prevent a convicted officer from later 
serving as President or Vice President. As such, a President or Vice 
President could be impeached, convicted, removed and barred from 
serving in all other offices. Yet these dishonored individuals, if they 
ran for national office again, could still serve as President or Vice 
President. Even worse, a President could vote on whether he ought to 
be impeached and on whether he ought to be convicted, for under Mr. 
Tillman's reading of the Incompatibility Clause, Presidents can 
simultaneously serve as members of Congress. 
Second, Presidents and Vice Presidents could freely accept 
presents, emoluments, offices and titles from foreign states because 
the constitutional bar applies only to offices under the United States,35 
and, according to Mr. Tillman, those two offices are not under the 
United States. But the provision barring Presidents from accepting 
foreign emoluments was arguably added to prevent Presidents from 
being corrupted by foreign bribes, as occurred when Charles II 
accepted money from France's Louis XIV.36 To read Article I, 
 
 34. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. 
 35. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
 36. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 33, at 68–69 (reporting Madison’s notes of Gouverneur 
Morris’s statement). 
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Section 9 as if it permitted the President to receive foreign bribes, 
without any congressional oversight or check, makes little sense. 
Third, Presidents and Vice Presidents may serve as presidential 
electors because, though the Constitution bars persons who hold 
offices "under the United States" from serving as presidential 
electors,37 Mr. Tillman's reading suggests that sitting Presidents and 
Vice Presidents are not officers "under the United States." This would 
bar the Secretary of Treasury and the local federal collector of 
customs from serving as electors while simultaneously allowing the 
President and Vice President to serve as electors and to vote for 
themselves or their successors, a rather incongruous result. 
Fourth, although the Constitution prohibits religious tests, the 
prohibition applies only to offices or to public trusts "under the 
United States."38 Hence the prohibition on religious tests would not 
apply to the President and Vice President, at least per Mr. Tillman's 
view, because neither occupies an office or public trust "under the 
United States."39 During the ratification fight, Tench Coxe discussed 
the bar against religious tests as it applied to the President, thus 
implying that the President does serve under the United States.40 
Indeed, I am aware of no evidence from the founding suggesting that 
the prohibition on religious tests does not apply to the President. 
Moreover, to prohibit a religious test for army generals, district 
attorneys, or postmasters, but to permit one for the President and Vice 
President is nonsense. Assuming that Congress could create a 
religious test, it could then also require that Presidents be Protestants 
or that no Catholic serve as President. Essentially, Congress would be 
able to mimic the English restrictions on who may serve as the 
English monarch. 
Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment's waivable bar against 
supporters of the Confederacy who had previously taken an oath to 
 
 37. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 38. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 39. Mr. Tillman argues that the President occupies a public trust. Tillman, supra note 1, at 
11 & n.25. But because this public trust is not “under the United States,” (at least according to 
Mr. Tillman’s argument, id. at 26–33) the Religious Test Clause cannot apply to the President. 
 40. See TENCH COXE, AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1787), reprinted in 
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS 
DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787–1788, at 146 (Paul L. Ford ed., Da Capo Press 1968) (1888). 
See also 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 33, at 215 (reporting comments by William Lancaster 
at the North Carolina ratifying convention that a Catholic or a Muslim may become President 
because there can be no religious test for the Presidency). 
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the Constitution41 would not apply to rebels who sought the office of 
President or Vice President because, once again, that bar would have 
applied only to offices "under the United States." Jefferson Davis and 
Robert E. Lee could have served as President of the United States 
without a congressional waiver of the bar against oath-breaking 
confederates. Reading this Amendment to require a congressional 
waiver for former confederates serving as postmasters or corporals 
but to not require such a waiver when a turncoat wished to serve as 
President would be rather strange. 
*** 
A reexamination of accepted orthodoxy is often useful, for 
sometimes it weakens that orthodoxy, causing it to crumble. Other 
times, it leads to a stronger, sounder orthodoxy, much like a 
vaccination makes a person healthier. Regardless of the conclusion 
reached about the soundness of the Incompatibility orthodoxy, Mr. 
Tillman has done us a service. 
The President occupies an office under the United States because 
he occupies an office created under the authority of the United States. 
Per the Incompatibility Clause, a Representative or Senator cannot 
serve as President while retaining his or her seat in Congress. Mr. 
Tillman tries his best to escape the clutches of this inescapable 
conclusion, but his arguments are unavailing. Neither Senator Obama 
nor Senator McCain could simultaneously remain in the Senate and 
serve as President. 
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